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Most U.S. citizens are born that way. But for immigrants, becoming a citizen is a slow 
process. This process includes applying for a "green card," which gives an imrnigrant 
the right to reside legally in the United States. A limited number of green cards are 
available, and applicants must demonstrate that they qualify for a green card, most 
commonly by showing a family relationship to a U.S. citizen or employment with a 
U.S. company. Obtaining a green card can take many years, and once an irnmigrant 
has obtained one, she must reside in the United States for several more years before 
she can apply to become a naturalized citizen, which in turn requires a civics test, 
an English language test, demonstration of good moral character, and an oath of 
loyalty to the United States. Becorning a citizen is not a one-time event that occurs 
when an irnrnigrant takes the loyalty oath, but a slow process of demonstrating value 
to the nation and assimilation to its culture and values. 
This chapter examines how this experience of becoming a citizen is affected by, 
and in turn further entrenches, gender inequality. Although the law of immigration 
and naturalization comports with principles of formal gender equality, the law, 
especially the law of immigration, has gendered effects. Women are eligible to apply 
for green cards based on a variety of qualifications, and their ability to qualify is 
determined primary by the economic and cultural circumstances frorn which they 
come. Most women are unable to meet the qualifications required for a green card 
based on employment because they lack the skills deemed important by the United 
States. Instead, the vast majority of women who apply to become permanent residents 
do so based on relationships with U.S. citizen family members, usually husbands. 
The result is that the pool of people available to seek naturalized citizenship includes 
a disproportionate number of women who are eligible because of their marital 
relationship and a disproportionate number of men who are eligible because of 
their occupational skills. 
Because rnarriage itself is a gender-producing institution, a system that creates 
future citizens based on marital status has profound effects for the way in which 
men and women experience becoming American. For both men and women who 
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seek citizenship through marriage, it is heterosexual marriage itself, and not the 
loyalty oath or civics test, that provides the most important vehicle for assimilation. 
Although marriage, and immigration law's use of marriage, have changed dramati- 
cally over the past hundred years, immigration law still makes the assumption that 
heterosexual rnarriages include a breadwinner, with decision-making authority over 
issues such as residency, and a subordinate spouse (a "derivative spouse" in immi- 
gration law tenns), who is dependent financially on the breaclwinning spouse. It 
requires couples to demonstrate their confonnity with these norms, even in cases 
where the norms simply do not fit. And in cases where the norrns do fit, the require- 
ment of confonnity further entrenches the notion that these norms represent what 
is expected of American farnilies. 
One of the legal mechanisms for irnposing this dichotomous and gendered view 
of marriage is the discretion it gives a citizen to decide whether or not to spomor 
his immigrant spouse for a green card. Because this broad discretion is often abused 
by spouses who are batterers, Congress has created numerous exceptions to the 
nounal rules for immigrants who can prove they have been battered. 'The creation 
of this class of future citizens further genders the pool of immigrants eligible for 
naturalization: many future U.S. citizens are eligible because they are battered 
spouses; they must show victimhood to demonstrate their worth as citizens. The 
remainder of this chapter examines in more detail how imrnigration law produces 
future citizens and the relationship between th is process and the production of 
gender. 
Immigration as the Gatekeeper of Citizenship 
Citizenship, like all status categories, serves a gatekeeping function. By demarcating 
who is in and who is out, it defines the collective whole.' 'Those who are in are, 
in the famous words of T, H. Marshall, given the "basic human equality associated 
with ... full membership of a cornmunitv"> Most citizens in the United States 
today are citizens by birth: their experience of citizenship is essentially ascriptive. In 
contrast, citizens who naturalize make a choice to be governed by the United States, 
and the United States makes a choice to accept them as citizens. In the United States, 
the criteria the government uses in making the decision to accept an irnrnigrant as 
a naturalized citizen include a civics test, an English test, demonstration of good 
moral character, residency for a number of years, and an oath of loyalty to the 
United States. Much has been written about what these criteria say about American 
self-definition and the meaning of American citizensh ip.! 
' See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenshi p and Nalionhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA Harvard 
University Press, 1992), at 23-31. 
T. 11. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Chapters (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950), at 8. 
l See, e.g., Gerald Neuman, "Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies," 35 \la. J lnt'L L .. 237, 267 (199,1); 
Peier J. Spiro, "Qucslioning Barriers to Naturalization," 13 Geo. Immigr. L. f. 479 (1999). 
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But naturalization law does not tell the entire citizenship story. The naturaliza- 
tion oath takes only a minute to recite, but the demonstration of worth required 
to becorne a citizen begins the minute an irnrnigrant applies for legal residency. 
Simone de Beauvoir farnously stated that "one is not born, rather, one becomes 
a woman." Sirnilarly, immigrants who become naturalized citizens of the United 
States obtain their citizenship status not through an accident of birth, hut instead, by 
repeatedly demonstrating their worth in ways that shape their identity and encour- 
age assimilation to American culture. For naturalizing citizens, the oath is a rite of 
passage, the institution of a new relationship between individual and nation. But the 
citizenship oath itself is merely the last in a lengthy series of acts that the immigrant 
must undertake to demonstrate his or her value to the country. 
To become a naturalized citizen, an immigrant must first become a lawful per- 
manent resident (comruonly referred to as a "green-card holder"). Green cards are 
not available to everyone one who wants one. Instead, U.S. immigration law sets out 
specific categories of imrnigrants who can qualify for permanent residency, and even 
those who qualify may sometimes have to wait many years before obtaining lawful 
residency because most categories are subject to annual quotas. Eligible immigrants 
include family members of U.S. citizens or permanent residents, immigrants who 
are sponsored by a U.S. employer for a particular job, political refugees, and so- 
called diversity immigrants frorn underrepresented countries who enter a lottery for 
U.S. residency. Of these categories, family-based irnrnigrants receive by far the most 
generous quotas and therefore dominate the number of immigrants who receive a 
green card each year. For example, in 2007, over 1 million immigrants were granted 
green cards, and of these, approximately 65 percent received them based on a family 
relationship to a U.S. citizen or resident, while around 15 percent went to irnrnigranl:s 
sponsored by an employer and nearly 8 percent went to refugees or asylees fleeing 
persecution in their home countries." Family relationships, with a strong emphasis 
on nuclear farnily relationships, predominate in shaping the pool of people eligible 
to obtain naturalized citizenship. 
Once an irnrnigrant demonstrates that she fits within one of the prescribed cate- 
gories, she must also demonstrate what she is not: a terrorist, an addict, a prostitute, 
a polygamist, or a child abductor. Even people who otherwise satisfy the admissions 
criteria will be excluded if they fall into any of these categories. So, too, will a 
person with a criminal record, if the crime involved "moral turpitude" or if more 
than one crirne was committed; anyone who enters illegally or with false documents 
( even if the correct documents would demonstrate that the person fits one of the 
admission categories); or a person with a communicable disease. There are very 
few ways around these exclusions; for most: of them, the only way to obtain discre- 
tionary relief is by demonstrating "extreme hardship" to a U.S. citizen or permanent 
-I "Yearbook of l mmigratiou Statistics: 2007," Table 6, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, available 
at ht:tp://www.clhs.gov/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2008). The percentages do not total 100 because there are 
other categories such as diversity immigrants. 
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resident family rnernber.> Thus, these requirements function to lirnit further the pool 
of potential citizens, once again by privileging those with family ties over others. 
After an immigrant has obtained green card status, the clock begins ticking until 
the elate when she is eligible to apply to become a naturalized citizen. A would-be 
citizen must reside continuously within the United States for at least five years. In 
aclclition, to naturalize, an immigrant must dernonstrate sufficient seriousness and 
assimilation to American values, language, and culture by carrying on a conver- 
sation in English, passing a civics test, swearing allegiance to the United States, 
and demonstrating "good moral character."? But never again must the naturalizing 
immigrant demonstrate that she qualifies for admission by virtue of a family tie, 
employment, persecution, or luck. Those gatekeeping questions were already asked 
and answered through the immigration process and now appear to be irrelevant for 
purposes of naturalization. The immigration restrictions, however, belie the idea 
that citizenship is merely a question of loyalty and assimilation. Only those immi- 
grants who initially qualified for permanent residence will be qualified to apply 
for citizenship. Immigration laws, even though they are not formally considered 
to be rules of naturalization, thus regulate membership by acting as gatekeepers of 
who can be admitted to the pool of eligible applicants for naturalized citizenship. 
Accordingly, immigration law performs much of the gatekeeping function usually 
attributed to naturalization in citizenship theory. 
This function is easy to overlook, in part because the law has neatly divided cit- 
izenship and immigration into two separate areas, with citizenship law treated as 
constitutional and important to national identity and immigration law as technical 
and statutory. Citizenship is clearly constitutional: all persons born in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are, under the language of the Four- 
teenth Amendment, U.S. citizens, and the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the 
power to create a "uniform rule of naturalization." But the power to regulate immi- 
gration is constitutional as well: although no particular clause grants Congress this 
power, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the federal government enjoys 
"plenary power" over irnmigration for a variety of reasons, including the country's 
status as a sovereign nation entitled to protect its borders." 
The law governing citizenship takes its cue from the naturalization clause and 
focuses on a uniform rule. But there is nothing in the Constitution requiring that 
immigration law be uniform, and, indeed, it is not. The United States frequently 
makes distinctions between incoming immigrants based on national origin, marital 
status, or educational background in the context of deciding who qualifies for a green 
card and offers immigration officials significant discretion in determining whom to 
admit. The law of immigration focuses not on uniformity, but on diversity: how to 
See 8 U .SC. SS 1182 (a), (g), (i) (2008). 
8 U .S.C. SS 14-27 (a)-(b) (2006) 
7 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV; U.S. Constitution, Article I, S 8, cl. 4; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787 (1977) (articulating plenary power doctrine); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (same). 
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choose from a variety of possible future citizens the ones who will become eligible 
to qualify under the uniform rule. 
Citizenship, as this book demonstrates, has rnany meanings. It can refer to the 
possession of political, civil, and social rights; active engagernent in the life of the 
political comrnunity; and ties of identification and solidarity. Many people who are 
not technically citizens enjoy some of these features of what we call "citizenship": 
they may, for example, be actively engaged in their comrnunities, feel solidarity with 
the United States, and intend to live here perrnanently (a green card holder is, after 
all, a "permanent resident"). But becoming a naturalized citizen gives an immigrant 
full political rights, including the right to remain in the country even if she commits 
a crime, the right to return if she leaves the country's borders, and the right to vote 
in federal elections. Citizenship status is durable: it cannot be taken away unless the 
citizen expresses a clear intent to expatriate herself, and under rnany circumstances, 
U.S. citizens can transmit their American citizenship to their children even if their 
children are born abroad, thus creating a new generation of American citizens. A 
green card holder is a permanent resident, but only a partial member; it is only upon 
naturalization that an immigrant becomes a full-fledged member of the political 
community. 
Understanding how immigrants become citizens, then, requires an understanding 
of the entire process ofbecorning, not just the moment of naturalization. It is through 
the entire naturalization process that the United States most clearly articulates what 
it requires of its citizens. Unlike citizens by birth, naturalized citizens are in a 
position to consent as adults to be governed and to take part in the governing that 
democracy entails. The questions the country asks of naturalizing citizens and how 
naturalizing citizens experience their becoming American are therefore crucial to 
understanding what American citizenship means, 
Neither the uniform rule of naturalization nor the law of irnmigration appears to 
be gendered. Nowhere does the Immigration and Nationality Act distinguish, for 
example, between husbands and wives of U.S. citizens, between brothers and sisters, 
or between male employees of U.S. companies and female employees. Yet immi- 
gration law is profoundly gendered in the way that it shapes the pool of immigrants 
available to become naturalized citizens because it uses the family as a preselection 
device in deciding which immigrants are worthy of gaining legal resident status 
and because it privileges some employment skills over others.8 Given the gendered 
8 In this chapter, l focus solely on the process of becoming a naturalized citizen. There are certainly 
things to say about the gendered aspects of citizenship by birth. Many commentators have pointed out 
the highly gendered nature of the [u» sanguinis (citizenship by blood) doctrine, as shown in Nguyen v. 
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (zooi ), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute that gives automatic 
citizenship to children born abroad to female U.S. citizens but requires children born abroad to male 
U.S. citizens to demonstrate their fathers' intent to parent, through either rnarriage to the mother or 
other acts demonstrating intent to claim paternity before the child turns eighteen. Although it: is true 
that this case shows a stark disparity in how the law conceives of male and female citizens and their 
ability to transmit citizenship to their children based on biological and social gender roles, as Rogers 
Smith argues in Chapter 1 of this volume, the number of people affected by the Nguyen holding 
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family systerns and ernployrneut markets that exist in immigrants home countries, 
it should be no surprise that their ability to obtain legal residency is also influenced 
by gender. 
Becoming a Citizen Through Employment 
One path to citizenship for immigrants is employment-based permanent residency. 
To obtain a green card under most employment preference categories, an i mmi- 
grant must have a job offer from an American company that has clernonst:rated its 
inability to find an American worker to do the job. The employee is, at least theo- 
retically, filling a gap in the American work force and contributing to the efficiency 
of the U.S. economy. The most preferred category goes lo "priority workers," which 
include aliens with "extraordinary ability" who have obtained "sustained national 
or international acclaim" for their work; "outstanding professors or researchers;" 
and "multinational executives and managers." The second category includes "pro- 
fessionals holding advanced degrees" and immigrants with "exceptional ability in 
arts, sciences, or business." T'he third category includes "skilled workers in short 
supply," "professionals with baccalaureate degrees," and "unskilled workers." Each 
of the first three categories has an annual quota of 40,000 workers, but the third 
category has a special subquota for so-called unskilled workers of just 10,000. There 
is also a fourth category for "special imrnigrants," which include clergy and former 
government employees, with a quota of 10,000, and a fifth category for "investors" 
who plan to hire Americans and invest at least $1 million in a business venture." 
Together, these categories work to generate a large pool of highly skilled workers 
and keep the number of unskilled workers low. 
As one might suspect frorn exarnining the employment-based immigration 
options, most people who enter the United States to work cannot achieve permanent 
residency. They either use temporary work visas that expire after a certain amount 
of time, or they enter illegally. Ernployrnent-based bermaneni residence visas (those 
that confer a green card) are limited by Congress to a rnaximum of 140,000 per year. 
The supply of these visas is far less than the demand, whether demand is measured 
by the immigrants who would like permanent residence and work in the United 
States or by the employers who would like to hire them. The government limits the 
number of employment visas because of the broad rights they confer. As a green 
card holder, an irnrnigrant can quit her job and take another, or not work at all; 
she is not a temporary worker or guest, but a potentially permanent part of the work 
force, with the personal autonomy that a U.S. citizen worker would have. In five 
years, she will be eligible to naturalize even if she quit her job immediately after 
is relatively small. l deal here with an issue that affects more people and has greater consequences 
for the expressive power of law: the requirements that citizenship law and immigration law place 011 
immigrants who desire to naturalize and the gendered consequences of these requirements. 
9 8 o.s.c. s 1153 (b) (2006). 
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arrival. Cranting an irnrnigrant pennanent resident status based on a particular job 
offered by a particular employer is a risk for the country, and it is a risk the country is 
wiJling to take only in cases where the immigrant has skills that are relatively scarce 
and likely to produce employment regardless of the solvency or status of a particular 
employer. The result is that the majority of slots for employment-based irnrnigration 
go to i111migrants with high levels of education or practice-based skills. 
It should be no surprise that cl system that values education and skills that require 
sustained employment would lead to unequal outcomes for men and women. 
Throughout much of the world, women are less likely than men to have received an 
education or have work experience and are more likely to be involved in care work 
for their families that wiJI interrupt or slow clown a career. This reality is reflected 
in statistics on permanent residency. On the surface, employment visas appear to be 
allocated in a gender-neutral manner: in 2004, for example, 75,025 went to women 
and 80,289 went to men.'? But a closer look at these statistics reveals that women 
are gaining irnmigranl: status not as employees, but as family members. A green card 
based on employment categories carries with it the privilege of bestowing "derivative 
status" on the employee's dependents. That means that an employee who gains res- 
idency under, say, the multinational executive category can also obtain green cards 
for his spouse and children. They, in turn, wiJI be considered employrnent-basecl 
immigrants, and they wiJI count toward the annual total of em.ployment visas. So 
to determine whether the men and women who receive employment-based green 
cards are really corning here as employees or as family members of employees, we 
must look to statistics on whether they are primary or derivative beneficiaries of the 
employment visa category. Again using the numbers for 2004, of the 75,025 women 
who received employment-based green cards, only 20,125 did so as the primary bene- 
ficiary; the other 54,900 were wives or children ( derivatives) of primary beneficiaries. 
Of the 80,289 men who received employment-based green cards, 52,417 were the pri- 
rnary beneficiaries, and 27,872 were derivative beneficiaries." Men overwhelrningly 
predominate as primary beneficiaries in employment-based irrnnigration. 
There certainly are some women who manage to obtain green cards through their 
own employrnent ~ in 2004, these women represented 3.9 percent of the women who 
obtained green cards. But the vast majority of women cannot immigrate this way. 
The economic experience of women in sending countries illustrates why. Imagine, 
for example, a very common example: an immigrant woman who would like to 
apply for green card status based on her ability to be a nanny. The employment 
categories are designed to attract immigrants in high-demand fields that are unlikely 
to be saturated by American workers. The Department of Labor (DOL) lists "child 
10 l chose to use the numbers from 2004 because they were the most recent statistics I could find. See 
"Women lnnnigranls and Family l.rnmigration," Legal Momentum, available at http://www.nilc.org/ 
(accessed Oct. 29, 2008) (citing Kelly Jeffreys, Characteristics of Familv-Soonsored Legal Permanent 




care worker" as an in-demand field,12 and yet, our prospective immigrant would have 
a very difficult time finding work as a nanny in the United States >- at least legally. 
First, she would have to apply for a green card. To do this, she would have to find 
an employer to sponsor her. It is unlikely, given the nature of the job, that many 
employers would be willing to make a commitment to sponsor a nanny without at 
least meeting the person who will care for their children for an interview, but this is 
impossible if the immigrant is living abroad. 
Even if she can find an employer to sponsor her, a child care worker will have a 
long wait for a green card. She is not a first-preference person of extraordinary ability, 
outstanding professor or researcher, or multinational executive, nor is she a second- 
preference professional holding an advanced degree or person of exceptional ability 
in the arts, science, or business. Immigrants entering under these categories can be at 
work in the United States within several months of applying because there is a large 
enough supply of slots (40,000 for each preference annually) to meet the demand. 
The only conceivable category our hypothetical child care worker will qualify for is 
the third preference for skilled and unskilled workers. This category has 40,000 spots 
per year but limits unskilled workers to only 10,000 slots, and the child care worker 
is likely to be considered unskilled. This is partly the result of the way the United 
States construes the terms skilled and unskilled. Immigration law defines skilled labor 
as work that requires at least two years of training or postsecondary education. The 
DOL, in turn, makes findings about specific occupations and how much training 
is needed for each. Because the DOL characterizes child care as needing "very 
little" experience, it generally counts as unskilled labor for immigration purposes. '3 
Because the number of unskilled workers who would like to immigrate to the United 
States far exceeds the 10,000 slots available, there is a long waiting list for this category. 
In October 2008, for example, the Citizenship and Imrnigration Bureau was finally 
processing green card applications for unskilled workers who applied for their green 
cards on January 1, 2003.14 By the time our hypothetical nanny gets her green card, 
the infant she is to care for will be in kindergarten. 
The classification of child care work as unskilled rests on certain assumptions 
about how skills are acquired. The child care worker's skill set was not acquired 
during an apprenticeship or graduate school, but instead during a lifetime of car- 
ing for other family members, gender socialization, and prioritizing family tasks 
over more individualistic pursuits. Child care is a job that many men would be 
unqualified for precisely because they have not received the same training and 
acculturation that many women have received - because they lack certain skills. 
The DOL's classification of this work as unskilled means that for the millions of 
12 
"Summary Report for Child Care Workers," O*net, available at http://online.onetcenter.org/ (accessed 
Feb. 23, 2009) (listing "child care worker" as an in-demand field). 13 
Ibid. (listing "child care worker" as an occupation for which "some previous work-related skill, knowl- 
edge, or experience may be helpful ... but usually is not needed" and for which "employees need 
anywhere from a few months to a year of working with experienced employees"). 
14 
See "Visa Bulletin for October 2008," available at http://travel.sl:ate.gov/ (accessed Oct. 29, 2008). 
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wornen who count extensive child care experience as their primary employment 
credential, legal employment-based irnrnigration is not an option, nor is citizenship 
flowing from legal employment-based irnmigration. Such a woman, unlike the corn- 
puter programmer, biology professor, clergyrnan, or physical therapist, cannot say, 
"I acquired citizenship in part because I had an important skill that was in short 
supply in the United States." Her most likely option for obtaining citizenship is to do 
so by rnarrying a U.S. citizen or as a derivative spouse of a male ernployment-based 
i In rn igran t. 
Becoming a Citizen Through Marriage 
Why Marriage? 
In employment-based immigration, the theory behind the preferences is easy to 
deduce. Congress has allocated the largest numbers of slots to imrnigrants who have 
skills or experience that will be useful to the American economy, without displacing 
native workers. Family-based imrnigration is more complicated. It is not self-evident 
why spouses of U.S. citizens would be more likely than other irnmigrants to add 
value to the nation, both as permanent residents and, eventually, as naturalized 
citizens. 
Surely from the perspective of immigration law, the reason to privilege marriage 
is largely one of administrative convenience; rnarriage provides a clear-cut category 
for deterrnining whether a romantic relationship is significant enough to trigger 
permanent resident status for an irnrnigrant. Inquiring into the details of individual 
relationships to determine whether a relationship is substantial and permanent would 
be unwieldy and potentially invasive. As in other areas oflaw, by allowing the state to 
cut through potentially enormous amounts of red tape, rnarriage does the work. But 
adrnin istrative convenience does not tell the whole story. The United States provides 
much broader family-based imrnigration than most Western receiving countries; 
there is nothing about marriage that necessarily gives an immigrant the right to 
relocate or change her citizenship. So why would the United States rely on marriage 
to do so much work in creating the pool of future citizens? 
There are several ways of thinking about why marriage, immigration status, and 
citizenship might, as a normative matter, be so closely tied. First, marriage is a useful 
way to determine whether someone is already a partial member of a community. By 
demonstrating a marital relationship, a prospective immigrant or citizen is in one 
sense already demonstrating that she is worthy of rnernbership in the society. She is 
essentially saying, "I am a member because I have close ties to a member," or even, "I 
am a member because a member has chosen me." Marriage makes the membership. 
A strong version of this theory of citizenship was evidenced in the Citizenship Act of 
1855, which made any woman who married a male U.S. citizen automatically a U.S. 
citizen herself, and the Expatriation Act of 1907, which automatically divested any 
female U.S. citizen of her citizenship if she married a foreigner. Under this theory, 
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;1 woruan could not be loyal to a nation and a husband of a different nationality. 
The act of attaining or renouncing citizenship was simultaneous with the act of 
rnarri;ige. There was no process of "becoming a citizen;" it simply happen eel when 
marriage happened. Today, wornen are no longer treated differently than men as an 
official matter, and marriage and citizenship are not statuses that immigrants enter 
into simultaneously. But the privileging of marriage relationships in citizenship still 
represents a weak form of the view that the fact of marriage gives us evidence that 
some cultural assimilation has already occurred. 
Second, we rn ight think of the treatment of marriage as a prediction of assirnilation 
and value.A person who marries a U.S. citizen rnight be perceived as more likely to 
become a stable, productive citizen. This rnight be because the U.S. citizen is more 
likely to be already embedded within American culture, in terms of friendships, 
employment contacts, linguistic competence, and cultural literacy. It also might be 
because a married couple is more likely to achieve financial stability, and this will 
reduce the immigrant's likelihood of becoming a public charge. In this view, the 
family functions as a crucible for assimilation. What exactly are the American values 
we expect to be inculcated through the marital relationship? These values depend in 
part on the kind of marriage being practiced, which may explain why irnrnigration 
law does not recognize, for example, polygamous marriages. Immigration law's 
preferences for spousal immigration could rely on a strong presumption that the 
citizen spouse will exert a stronger pull, possibly because she will be constantly 
supported by the surrounding culture, than the immigrant spouse, thus working to 
acculturate the noncitizen. But in some communities, especially where the citizen 
spouse is a recent immigrant himself, this may not be the case at all. The more 
recent irnrnigrant spouse could perform the role of preventing the citizen spouse 
from becoming too American by acting as a reminder of the cultural norms of the 
home country and thwarting assimilation. 
Tlurd, rnarriage and citizenship may be linked because we care about the rights 
of U.S. citizens to exercise their own citizenship through transmitting it to others. 
Citizens exercise citizenship in many ways - by voting, by participation in public 
and civic life, by service on juries, and by service in the military (although rnany 
of these exercises of citizenship are or have been available to noricitizens as well). 
One way in which citizens can exercise their citizenship is by transrnitting it to 
someone else - to a child or to a spouse. Although courts have been reluctant to 
explicitly grant rights to immigrants based on the interests of their citizen relatives, 
sympathy for the plight of U.S. citizens stranded without their loved ones pervades 
the irnrnigration statutes. Not only do the admissions categories favor family immi- 
grants, but the waivers to exclusions based on the immigrant's health, criminal 
background, or fraudulent activity all focus on the question of whether excluding 
the immigrant will cause hardship to the U.S. citizen or permanent resident, not the 
immigrant. Although there is 110 constitutional right to family unity in this regime, 
Americans who seek to reunite with their foreign family members are given statutory 
assistance. 
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Marriage, then, is linked to imrnigration and citizenship status in import.mt ways, 
ancl for a variety of reasons. Some oi tliese reasons rnay include the idea that marriage 
tells us something, both retrospectively and prospectively, about the likelihood that 
an irnrnigrant will assimilate successfully, and the idea that marriage is a valuable 
enough activity for citizens that we should facilitate their ability to marry, even if 
their choice of mate is not an Arneiican. But marriage also requires the parties to 
the marriage to take on certain burdens, including a duty of support and a duty 
of services to the other. Requiring couples to be married does not simply take the 
temperature of the relationship to determine the legitirnacy of the bond. It also 
measures how willing a couple is to enter into an institution with a lot of rnoral and 
political baggage and to take on obligations of financial support to each other. And 
because marriage operates as a near prerequisite to citizenship for many women, it 
is worth thinking about how marriage shapes women's identity and what the costs of 
relying on it to create a pool of citizens might be. 
How Immigration Law Shapes Marriage 
A first-order issue is the conditions under which wornen rnarry in their countries 
of origin. Despite clivorce reforms, including the move to a no-fault divorce system 
that took place in t:he United Stales and many Western democracies in the 1970s, 
many countries still retain divorce laws in which it is difficult or impossible for a 
wornan to extricate herself frorn a bad marriage. In many countries, the average 
age of marriage for women is very young, and because wornen have scarce oppor- 
tunities to enter into professions or trades that would make them self-supporting, 
marriage is t:he only econornically viable option, even if the terms of marriage are not 
opti mal. 
Once they arrive in t:he United States, irnn1igration law encourages irrnnigrants to 
shape their marriages in ways that confonn to an American model of marriage. To 
demonstrate that a newly entered marriage is not fraudulent, immigrants (and their 
citizen spouses) must provide evidence of the legitimacy of their marriages. Th is 
evidence usually goes far beyond documentation that the marriage occurred; the reg- 
ulations, for example, list the following as factors l:o be considered: (1) documentation 
showing joint ownership of property; (2) a lease showing joint tenancy of a common 
residence; (3) documentation showing commingling of financial resources; (4) birth 
certificates of children horn to the marriage; (5) affidavits of third parties having 
knowledge of the bona fides of the marital relationship; or (6) other documenta- 
tion establishing that the marriage was not entered into to evade the immigration 
laws of the United States." In other words, the immigrant is encouraged, although 
not required, to shape her identity in ways that will make her marriage look bona 
fide, and these ways basically boil clown to cohabitation, commingling of funds, 
and children, regardless of what marriage means to her and her spouse. It is the 
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interdependency of marriage, and its sexual and reproductive aspects, that are seen 
as indicia of genuineness. Although the regulations do not say it, it is highly un I ikely 
that a married couple who admitted they had no romantic or sexual relationship 
would qualify as bona fide for innnigration purposes. Participation in heterosexual 
marriage, and a very particular kind at that, is the prerequisite for permanent resi- 
dent status based on a personal relationship. This requirement can shape marriages 
in various directions. Some couples rnay make their marriages more traditional in 
an effort to demonstrate their bona fides. But for some couples, the requirements 
1nay force them to make their marriages more egalitarian. A joint bank account, for 
example, might be a step back frorn separate bank accounts but an improvement 
from one bank account, accessible only by the husband. 
The act of becoming a citizen through heterosexual rnarriage carries with it the 
corollary that one cannot become a citizen through other relationships. Under the 
Defense of Marriage Act, a "spouse" is defined as an opposite-sex marital partner, 
and "rnarriage" is defined as a union between a man and a wornan. Therefore, every 
time an immigration law provision refers to "spouse" or "marriage," it means only 
opposite-sex spouses and marriages, regardless of whether a couple has been legally 
married under the law of another country.l" 
Much has been written on the effect that this exclusion has on gay and lesbian 
couples seeking irnrnigration status.17 In many cases, it means that couples are unable 
to live together because there is no alternative immigration category available. Sorne 
couples have resorted to marriage fraud ( in which the immigrant spouse marries a 
U.S. citizen of the opposite sex) to live in the same place. The nonrecognition 
of same-sex relationships may affect the development of these relationships. In 
nascent relationships in which two people know they have little chance of being 
able eventually to live together, investing in a long-term relationship may simply 
seem out of the question. Denying gay and lesbian citizens the opportunity to 
sponsor a spouse puts them in a different relationship to the state than other citizens. 
Their citizenship rights are reduced; this particular aspect of their citizenship can be 
exercised only by entering into a marriage that feels like a sham. Because marriage is 
the institution thatassirnilates the noncitizen spouse to American values and culture, 
the law's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages implies that there is sornething un- 
American about these marriages. Assuming that the noncitizen spouse plans to reside 
in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage or domestic partnerships, which seems 
fairly likely, it is unclear what makes him or her so different from the American 
citizens already living there. (If anything, a person who immigrates to the United 
States might be doing so because a gay or lesbian identity is more accepted in 
American culture than in her country of origin.) 
16 !\dams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982); 1 U.S.C. S 7 (2000). 
17 In addition, much has been written about the history of the categorical exclusion of gays and lesbians 
as immigrants, regardless of their relationship status. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. and Nan D. 
Hunter, eek, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), at 1360-67. 
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In addition to encouraging irnrnigrants to shape their marriages into a particular 
brand of heterosexual union to avoid the appearance of fraud, immigration law also 
shapes irnrnigrant marriages in other ways. The first of these is the somewhat curious 
practice of requiring the citizen or legal resident spouse to "sponsor" the immigrant 
spouse for imrnigration status, rather than simply having the imrnigrant apply herself. 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an immigrant who wants to use his or 
her status as a spouse of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident does not automatically 
become eligible to file for a green card. Instead, the immigrant's citizen spouse must 
sponsor her for green card status. In other words, a citizen can prevent his spouse, 
whether intentionally or negligently, frorn obtaining legal status simply by failing to 
file the appropriate paperwork, and there is nothing the immigrant spouse can do 
about it. 
In the context of current family law, the spousal sponsorship requirement looks 
quite unusual. Marriage in farnily law is a hybrid institution that is part status and 
part contract, and there are some core status concepts that exist to prevent one 
spouse from taking unfair advantage of the other. For example, many states have 
elective share laws that ensure that a surviving spouse will receive a fair portion 
of a deceased spouse's estate, even if the deceased spouse explicitly disinherited 
the surviving spouse in her will. Furthermore, courts frequently refuse to enforce 
contracts between married couples if the contract: would work a financial injustice 
on one party, and they certainly do not allow one spouse to dictate to the other 
whether to work outside the borne, where to live, or whether to travel. In one sense, 
the whole point of marriage is to access a set of benefits and burdens: each spouse 
gains rights vis-a-vis the other, and those rights create reciprocal burdens=- the right 
to be supported also means a duty to support. 
Immigration law turns the idea of marriage as a committed status into an institution 
into which a citizen spouse can selectively opt in or out. If citizen spouses want their 
immigrant spouses to come to the United States to live with them, they can choose 
to sponsor them, but if they would rather keep them at a distance, they have the 
option of refusing to do so. lmrnigration law essentially gives the reins to the citizen 
spouse to decide what his or her marriage means, regardless of the wishes of the 
immigrant spouse. 
Although the spousal sponsorship requirement strikes an odd chord in the context 
of rnarriage law today, when it was first instituted, it made much more sense. At 
common law, a woman's citizenship followed her husband's, and husbands, as 
heads of household, had decision-making control over many aspects of their wives' 
lives, including whether to administer chastisement, how to manage the wife's 
property, and where the couple would live. Although domestic relations law had 
changed considerably by the 1920s, when the first numerical quotas were placed 
on immigration, the idea of the husband as head of household was still reflected 
in the laws. Unlike today's immigration law, which defines an "immediate relative" 
as the spouse or child of a citizen, the 1921 Immigration Act defined an imrnediate 
relative as the wife of a male citizen. Husbands offemale citizens were not eligible to 
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irnrnigrate based on their marriages; in fact, their citizen wives lost U.S. citizeuship 
by marrying cl foreigner.'8 Control over a wife's irnmigration status was seen as part 
and parcel of a husband's right to control his household; wives dicl not share the 
same right. When a visa requirement was added in 1924, it made sense that a wife 
ch1irning to be entitled to a visa by virtue of her rnarriage to a U.S. citizen husband 
would need, in essence, to seek her husband's permission to do so by asking hirn to 
file a petition on her behalt.!? The male head of household was the decision maker 
regarding the domicile not only of his children, but of his wife."? 
This formal discrimination between husbands and wives was eliminated in 1952, 
when Congress changed the word "wife" to "spouse" and gave both male and fernak 
citizen spouses control over their immigrant spouses' immigration status." But mak- 
ing the statute gender-neutral has not resulted in substantive equality. Because a 
majority of immigrants who use their status as the spouse of a U.S. citizen to obtain 
legal irnrnigration status are female, the law disproportionately affects immigrant 
women. 'The law continues to grant astonishing power to the citizen spouse. People 
often do things their spouses do not like - they spend too much of the couple's 
joint income; they work outside the home (or do not); they have different standards 
of cleanliness or television watchinz or parenting - but the law does not: usually 
' b' b 
interfere to give one spouse power over t:he other's decision-making process. In mar- 
riages in which wives already experience subordination, the additional power to the 
husband conferred by immigration law can exacerbate these power dynamics. 
Contemporary irnrnigration law's retention of the spousal sponsorship require- 
rneut may once again rest on concerns about administrative convenience: this is the 
way thi11gs had been clone before, and the spousal sponsorship requirement neatly 
matches the requirement that an employer sponsor an imrnigra11t in the employ- 
ment categories. There may also be concerns about fraud: what if the immigrant 
spouse is lying about the marital relationship? Although this should be easy to detect 
through documentation, requiring the citizen spouse (who, in theory, might have 
less of an interest than the immigrant in the immigrant's permanent residency if 
the marriage were a sham) to sponsor the immigrant might reduce the number of 
fraud cases. Convenience aside, however, the spousal sponsorship requirement has 
serious consequences for immigrant spouses. As an expressive matter, the citizen 
spouse stands in for the nation. The immigrant spouse's reason for obtaining legal 
permanent residency (and, ultimately, citizenship) is her tie to t:he citizen spome. J\ 
marriage on paper may not be enough to ensure that the tie is significant enough to 
'8 Act of May 29, ,921, Prrb. I,. 5, S2(a), 42 Stat. 5; [•'.xp,1lriat:ion Act, ch. 2534, ~ 3, 3'1 Stat. 1228, 1228-29 
(H)07). 
'9 Act of May 26, H)24, ch. 190, S 7(b), 43 St,11. 153, 156 (1952). 
'0 Indeed, ,1 wife's domicile was presumed lo Follow 11,at· of her husband for jurisdictional purposes well 
into the twentieth century. Sec Mas v. Perry, 489 l<".2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974) (overtnrning a lower court 
decision that· a U.S. citizen wife's domicile followed that of her foreign husband). 
" An Act to Revise the Laws ReLtt:ing to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality; and for Other 
Purposes, Pub f ,. 82--414, 66 Stat. 163, 178 (1952). 
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warrant lawful perrnanent resident status; the ernergence of no-fault divorce rneans 
that marriage as a legal status has ceased to have permanence. The nation relies 
on the citizen spouse to make this judgment call, based on his feelings about the 
immigrant spouse. Is the couple really in it for the long haul? If so, then the nation 
is, too. 
The spousal sponsorship requirement also has the potential to alter the dynamics 
of a rnarriage in unintended ways. It gives the citizen spouse power that one spouse 
does not normally have over the other, at least not in the United States. Indeed, the 
spousal spm isorsh i p re qui rem en twas a major ca use of the passage of the i m rn igration 
portions of the Violence Against Women Act (VA 'vVA), which create exceptions to the 
spousal sponsorship rules for battered spouses. Because citizen spouses sometimes 
use the threat of nonsponsorship to keep an immigrant spouse in an otherwise 
abusive relationship, VA 'vVA created exceptions for imrnigrant spouses who could 
prove they were bat ered. But the necessity of VA 'vVA should make us wonder about 
the sponsorship requirement altogether: why should one member of a married 
couple be allowed to dictate what marriage means for immigration and, ultimately, 
citizenship? The act of sponsorship becomes a syrnbolic act of charily, altruism, and 
sacrifice on the part of the citizen spouse, in part because it is not required. The 
irnmigrant spouse comes to the United States already indebted to the citizen spouse: 
she eventually becomes eligible for naturalization because of the good graces of 
an American who was kind enough to sponsor her. For the citizen spouse, the act 
of sponsorship is an exercise of citizenship: through sponsorship, he transrnits his 
citizenship to another, and th is act is independent of the decision to marry. Control 
goes to the citizen spouse in part because of the notion that citizen spouses have 
rights to be with their families if they want to be. It is a right not of rnarriage, but of 
citizenship. 
Irnrnigration law not only puts the immigrant spouse in a subordinated position, 
but it also forces the sponsoring, citizen spouse into a breadwinning position. In 
addition to sponsoring his immigrant spouse, the citizen spouse rnust also sign an 
affidavit of support that demonstrates that he can support the immigrant at an annual 
income that is not less than 125 percent of the federal poverty line. This number 
is calculated by adding the immigrant (and any relatives immigrating with her) 
to the number of people already in the sponsor's household and looking up the 
federally published salary necessary for that year. The immigrant spouse's ability to 
earn an income herself will be deemed irrelevant in the calculation. The obliga- 
tion of support is potentially permanent; it ends only if the sponsored immigrant 
becomes a naturalized citizen; she works for approximately ten years ( or, in the 
case of a married immigrant, her spouse works for ten years while they are mar- 
ried); she relinquishes permanent resident status and leaves the country; or she dies. 
None of these exigencies is completely within the control of the citizen sponsor. If 
the irnrnigrant spouse chooses not to apply for citizenship or refuses or cannot work, 
she can sue her citizen sponsor for support under the affidavit of support, even if 
they have divorced. The affidavit of support requirement forces the citizen spouse 
54 Kerry Abrams 
into a breaclwinning role regardless of the actual dynamics of the relationship, and 
has the potential to do so even once the rnarriage is over.22 
Together, the requirement that rnarriage be heterosexual, the grant of control to 
the citizen spouse over the immigrant spouse's immigration status, the requirernent 
that the citizen spouse demonstrate that he can function as a breadwinner, and the 
strong incentives couples are given to conform to particular ideals of cohabitation, 
commingling of funds, and children add up to a vision of a particular kind of 
heterosexual marriage in which one family member subordinates her autonomy 
and identity to her spouse. Of course, the law is completely gender-neutral. There 
is 110 requirement that the citizen spouse be a man, or that the imrnigrant spouse 
be a woman, A woman citizen will have to demonstrate breadwinning capabilities 
and will have decision-making authority over whether her husband can apply for a 
green card. But given the gendered dynamics that already exist in many marriages, 
and given that the majority of marriage-based immigration involves citizen husbands 
sponsoring immigrant wives, the imp! ications of the law for many citizen-immigrant 
rnarriages are troubling. By dernanding that immigrants fit a traditional model of 
marital gender roles, the law may be perpetuating and exacerbating these roles in 
ways that are harmful to women. 
Naturalization 
Immigration law, then, shapes the pool of potential naturalized citizens and puts 
them through a crucible of training to become Arnericans by their participation in 
heterosexual marriage. But once a green card is acquired, this process goes on. The 
default rule for citizenship is that the applicant must undergo a five-year residency 
period after obtaining a green card. But for spouses of citizens, regardless of the 
irnrnigrant category used for green card purposes, th is period is reduced to three 
years if they are "living in marital union." Unlike in the context of imrnigration law, 
there is no administrative convenience purpose for this rule. There, the law is trying 
in part to ascertain whether a relationship really counts as a family relationship, 
but here, all green card holders are eligible to naturalize if they meet the residency 
requirements, take the oath, pass the tests, and are of "good moral character." In the 
case of the reduced number of years for citizenship, we see a rnore concentrated 
example of what we saw in the immigration context: marriage to a citizen is a proxy for 
8 U.S.C. S u83a (2002); 8 C.F.ll. S 213a.2(e) (2007); Form l-864P. T'he sponsor's 
oblig;ition to support the immigrant also terminates if the sponsor dies. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 213'1-2 (e)(ii) (2007); see also Cheshire v. Cheshire, 3:05-cv-00453-TJC-MCR, 2006 WL 1208010, 
at "In 8 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006) (holding that the husband in divorce action is liable for payments 
based on affidavit of support, tliat it is immaterial whether the defendant can afford the judgment, 
and that the wife is not required lo work). The sponsor's obligation to support the imuugrant also 
terminates if the sponsor dies. 8 C.!i.R. S 213a.2 (c)(ii) (2007). However, if the deceased sponsor foiled 
to snpport· H,e immigrant while alive, the im,nigr:rnt may sue the deccased's estate. 8 C.F.R. § 213 a.z 
(e)(2) (1-erminalion does not relieve the sponsor's estate from any reimbursement obligation tk1t 
accrucr] before termination). 
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assimilation, both prospectively and retrospectively, and the reduced waiting period 
can also be construed as a privilege of citizenship enjoyed by the citizen spouse. Once 
again, engagement in heterosexual marriage is thought to shape immigrants in a way 
that makes them more likely to be true "Americans" by the time they naturalize. Also, 
once again, sarne-sex marriages do not qualify. From the government's perspective, 
perhaps a married legal resident is less risky than a single resident or someone 
married to a foreigner. The government is willing to make the jump from granting 
legal residency (which can be revoked if the irnmigrant commits a crime, or spends 
too much tirne living abroad, or demonstrates bad moral character) to granting 
citizenship ( which is permanent) at an earlier date than it would for someone else. 
Marriage tames the irnmigrant into a citizen. 
Becoming a Citizen by Becoming a Victim 
By privileging family immigration and granting citizens the power to withhold spon- 
sorship from their irnrnigrant spouses, U.S. immigration law has created a need for 
a patchwork of exceptions to the normal rules of imrnigration admissions. Whereas 
normally, an immigrant must demonstrate family ties, employment opportunities, 
or refugee status or win the diversity lottery to gain legal admission, the law makes 
exceptions for battered spouses and children. It does so in part because of the perverse 
effect of the spousal sponsorship requirement: some spouses withhold or threaten to 
withhold sponsorship to keep their spouses in an abusive relationship. The law pro- 
vides a self-petitioning option for immigrants who demonstrate that they have been 
battered or subjected to "extreme cruelty" by their citizen or permanent resident 
spouses. In these cases, because of the immigrant's status as a battered spouse, the 
citizen spouse loses control over the immigration process.23 
In addition to qualifying for exceptions to the general immigration rules, battered 
spouses are also eligible for exceptions to the general naturalization rules. Battered 
spouses are entitled to naturalize in three years, just as if they were married to a U.S. 
citizen, even if they have divorced the citizen. If a person obtained lawful permanent 
resident status "by reason of his or her status as a spouse or child of a United States 
citizen who battered him or her or subjected him or her to extrerne cruelty," then 
the person is still entitled to the three-year, instead of the normal five-year, waiting 
period.r+ 
All of these provisions became law as part of the VA WA of 1994 and subsequent 
VA WA amendments. As the title of the act suggests, Congress was concerned about 
the plight of battered women, not battered men, when it passed VAWA. The immi- 
gration provisions, like most irnrnigration provisions today, are gender-neutral on 
their face. But they are designed to treat a problem that Congress believed affected 
mostly women, and indeed, women are far more likely to bring VAWA claims than 
'l 8 U.S.C. S 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
'4 8 U.SC. S 143o(a)(2008). 
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men and to have those claims taken seriously when they do. The law thus affects 
men and women very differently, both in terms of who is likely to take advantage of 
it and in terms of how it shapes the identities of those who do. 
Tl re VA'vVA exceptions provide a challenge to the usual idea that citizenship 
involves a consenting relationship between citizen and state. In the case of a battered 
spouse, the reason for her relationship with the state - both in the initial inquiry 
concerning her green card status and later, during the naturalization process - is 
her battering. She thus consents to a relationship with a nation because of her 
involvernent in a relationship that violated her consent. We rnight even think that 
she is not in a position to consent because she is fleeing a relationship of coercion. 
These exceptions also twist the usual way in which marriage is used as a shortcut 
to citizenship status. In the usual case, the law presumes that marriage helps to 
assimilate the irnmigrant; through the relationship with the citizen spouse, the 
immigrant becomes more likely to be a productive citizen. In the battering cases, 
the state steps in to replace the battering spouse. The new citizen's treatrnent by 
her spouse in a private space becomes the basis for her public relationship with 
the nation. But instead of the private relationship standing in for the project of 
assimilation, public belonging is now the result of the deviance and corruption of 
the private relationship; the prospective citizen's relationship with the nation is a 
substitute for her relationship with a husband/protector who has gone wrong. The 
nation rnust step in as her protector. 
From the government's perspective, a green card given because of an immigrant's 
victim status looks very different frorn one given based on an irnmigrant's employ- 
merit potential or farnily connections. In the latter cases, the decision to make 
residency legal - and ultimately, to open the possibility of citizenship - appears to 
be based on a calculation that the immigrant is likely to be of value to the country, 
either became of the skills she brings as a worker or the stability she offers as a 
family member of a citizen or resident. As we have seen, in the case of the family 
preferences, there is also a sense that she is more assimilable because of her family 
relationship. In the case of the battered imrnigrant, it is unclear what exactly the 
nation gains by giving the immigrant a green card. Battered spouses do not appear 
lo have superior character trails or skills (at least not any that result from their being 
battered), and if the family relationship that produced the visa application has ended, 
it is unclear why the government would think that the imrnigrant would provide 
stability to the citizen's family life. If anything, a truly merit-based immigration sys- 
tem might worry that admitting victims of domestic violence would undennine the 
principles of immigration law; even if it is not the immigrant's fault, being a victim 
is not usually a qualification for a green card or citizenship, just as being poor or 
unskilled is not. In the case of domestic violence victims, the nation appears to be 
offering a helping hand not because the immigrant brings something special to the 
nation, but because the nation placed the immigrant at risk. It is the nation's fault, 
in a sense, that it required the victim to be sponsored by her spouse, so if the nation 
wants to justify keeping the spousal sponsorship requirement in most cases, it must 
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make exceptions for the cases in which the citizen spouse has not upheld his end of 
the bargain. 
The VA WA petitioner who ultimately becomes a citizen, then, stands in rnarked 
contrast to the family- or employer-sponsored immigrant. The immediate relative is 
worthy because of a flourishing relationship (even if we might worry that flourishing 
marital relationships can nevertheless be subordinating); the employee is worthy 
because she can do work that is needed in this country, for which American workers 
are not available. But the battered spouse petitioner gains green card status not 
because she is a desirable worker or family member, but because the state has 
stepped in to protect her. To become a citizen, a VAWA imrnigrant must first 
becorne a victim. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that citizenship does not occur at the moment of naturaliza- 
tion, but is instead a process, occurring over several years. The law explicitly imposes 
this process by specifying the categories of irnrnigrants who may ultimately apply for 
naturalization. These immigrants become citizens not primarily through studying 
for their naturalization exams or learning English, although these are important 
elements, but through the everyday actions of living their lives. The United States 
puts particular stock in the ability of citizens to acculturate their immigrant spouses 
through marriage. Encouraging irnmigration based on marriage, then, is both a 
reflection of this reality and a way of reifying it. 
The emphasis on farnily-based immigration and the limitation on access to 
employment-based immigration have a profound influence on the way in which 
women become citizens. For many wornen, the process of becoming occurs through 
participation in heterosexual marriage, an institution that shapes identity in ways that 
are sornetirnes subordinating for women. As Nancy Cott has shown, the institution of 
marriage has been "the vehicle for the state's part in forming and sustaining the gen- 
der order," and the law of immigration and citizenship has, throughout history, aided 
and abetted this formation and sustenance." In the case of irnrnigration law, the 
law deepens marriage's subordinating potential by putting immigrant spouses at the 
mercy of their citizen sponsors, who can refuse to offer sponsorship; even a woman 
who does not: experience heterosexual marriage as subordinating has the dynamics of 
her marriage altered through the requirement that she seek her husband's approval 
to apply for permanent resident status and by the requirement that he demonstrate 
his financial ability to support her regardless of her own earning potential. For those 
women whose rnarriages fail clue to violence and abuse, the system offers an unfor- 
tunate resolution: they may become citizens capable of choosing allegiance to the 
25 Nancy F. Cott, "M"rriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-H)34," 103 Am. Hist. 
Rev. 1140, 1442 (1998). 
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United States, but only by demonstrating that they have experienced a failure of 
autonomy in their personal lives. 
In addition to telling us much about what the United States values in assessing 
potential citizens, immigration law also tells us something important about how the 
United States allows its citizens to exercise their citizenship. Citizens can sponsor 
their spouses, and indeed are given control over the decision of whether an immi- 
grant spouse will live in the United States. For some citizens (who are likely to 
be disproportionately male), this ability may often mean not only access to com- 
panionship and friendship, but also access to someone to care for children and to 
perform household labor. But for citizens who wish to sponsor an employee, rather 
than a relative, to perform care work, immigration law fails to provide a legal means. 
Because of the gendered allocation of household labor that persists in the majority of 
American families, immigration law's privileging of the family member over the care 
worker affects the ability of U.S. citizens to exercise their citizenship by extending 
immigration status to others in ways that are also gendered. Men are simply more 
likely to be able to depend on a wife to perform care work for free than women are 
able to depend on men; most women must go to the open market if they seek assis- 
tance in this work, and immigration law does not allow them to do so legally. Just a 
few decades ago, immigration patterns commonly involved early migration by men, 
followed by family migration of their wives and children. That pattern is now chang- 
ing: many women are rnigrating, including women with families, alone, commonly 
to do care work for other people's farnilies.r" Although there are reasons to be very 
concerned about commodification of care work and exploitation of domestic work- 
ers, pushing these practices underground and refusing to recognize the citizenship 
potential of women involved in this work does nothing to ameliorate these concerns. 
Of course, not all immigrants who obtain legal residency, and ultimately, citizen- 
ship, through employment are men, and not all those who obtain it through family 
relationships or victim status are women. For some couples, the system may even 
have subversive potential. A system that demands that the U.S. citizen spouse take 
on the role of decision maker, sponsor, and breadwinner may not only entrench the 
subordination in some marriages, but also may provide the possibility of role reversal 
in others. Given the ways in which many marriages retain at least some vestiges of 
traditional gender roles, however, it seems likely that much of the effect of the law is 
a one-way ratchet. Even an ostensibly gender-neutral requirement like the spousal 
sponsorship requirement, or the exceptions for battered spouses - male and fernale - 
set forth in VAWA, may have, on average, very different influences on men and 
women because of their different experiences of marriage as an institution. 
Every naturalized citizen has an immigration story and a citizenship story. This 
chapter has tried to show that these stories are related, perhaps even coextensive. The 
26 See, e.g., Rhacel Salazar Parrenas, "The Care Crisis in the Philippines: Children and Transnational 
Families in the New Global Economy," in Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hoschschild, eds., 
Global Women: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2002), at 39-54- 
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story of naturalization is not simply a story of jumping through the hoops required by 
the naturalization laws; it is also one of establishing a legal identity as an immigrant 
by qualifying for a particular type of irnrnigration status, and then living in the 
United States for a period of time, most often engaging every day in the activity, be it 
marriage or crnployrnent, that justified the status in the first place. Thus, a person's 
immigration story informs her citizenship story. 
The woman whose immigration story is one of following her husband because of 
his job prospects is in a different position vis-a-vis the nation on the eve of her nat- 
uralization ceremony than is the immigrant computer programmer who obtained 
an employment-based green card, or the refugee who suffered political persecution, 
or even the diversity lottery winner who was simply lucky. Her contribution to the 
United States is qualitatively different, based not on the value of her skills, a moral 
clairn of entitlement because of persecution, or growing up in an underrepresented 
country, but instead on her participation as a wife in heterosexual marriage. In 
cases of spouses who obtain legal status because of domestic violence, the contri- 
bution is even more attenuated. The archetypical story of the fresh, entrepreneurial 
spirit contributed by the immigrant, of the constant reenergizing of the population 
through the assimilation of new blood, takes on a different cast in the case of family 
immigration, one where the new voices are telling an old story of marital duty and 
self-denial in the face of a spouse's life projects. On the eve of their naturalization, 
immigrants who achieve legal status as a result of family relationships or victim status 
have a relationship with the nation, but it is a relationship that has been mediated 
by their spouses. This mediated relationship between individual and nation is one 
that develops over time and in a process of becoming, rather than in a moment of 
consent between individual and nation. For some women, "becoming a woman," as 
defined by Beauvoir, and becoming a citizen are intertwined processes: both occur 
through the crucible of marriage, and learning how to be a woman in rnarriage is 
part of learning to be a citizen. 
There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas outlined in this chapter. Eradicating 
immigration law of its privileging of the family would create serious problems, espe- 
cially for children. Much of the gender difference in immigration law results frorn 
the conditions in immigrants' countries of origins and not because of the law itself. 
But some of the particularly troubling aspects could at least be tempered. Recogniz- 
ing care work as skilled labor, for example, would give child care workers a path to 
citizenship because of the skills they possess. Elirninating the spousal sponsorship 
requirement would give immigrants the autonomy to decide for themselves whether 
their residency and domicile should follow that of their U.S. citizen spouses. Elim- 
inating the affidavit of support, or altering it to reflect total family income instead of 
the income of the citizen spouse, would avoid reinscribing a breadwinner-dependent 
dynamic in marriages. Recognizing the changing gender dynamics in immigration 
law is an important: first step to gaining substantive equality in the acquisition of 
citizenship. 
